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Abstract The phenomenon of mixed quotation exhibits clear signs of both
the apparent transparency of compositional language use and the opacity
of pure quotation. I argue that the interpretation of a mixed quotation in-
volves the resolution of a metalinguistic presupposition. The leading idea
behind my proposal is that a mixed-quoted expression, say, “has an anoma-
lous feature”, means what x referred to with the words ‘has an anomalous
feature’. To understand how this solves the paradox, I set up a precise
grammatical framework, explicitly connecting various levels of linguistic
analysis: phonological forms, categorial syntax, and a dynamic picture of the
semantics–pragmatics interface. In this framework I formalize and evaluate
a presuppositional account of mixed quotation. Finally, I address the phe-
nomenon of unquotation and argue that it is an essential ingredient for an
empirically adequate analysis of mixed quotation in natural language.
Keywords: metalinguistic reference; mixed quotation; unquotation; opacity; compo-
sitionality; syntax–semantics interface; presupposition
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We use language to talk about individuals, events, times, states of affairs, and
possibilities, but we can also use it to talk about words, letters, sentences
and utterances. Quotation is useful tool for doing the latter: using language
to refer to linguistic entities.
Quotation is, however, not a unitary phenomenon. In addition to so-
called pure quotation, there is a family of related linguistic phenomena, all
associated with quotation marks and/or metalinguistic reference of some
kind. Here are three example quotation types that will come up in this paper:












This paper is about mixed quotation, so-called by Davidson 1979, who char-
acterizes it syntactically as a mix of indirect and direct discourse.
My goal in this paper is to resolve the paradox of mixed quotation, i.e.,
the puzzling fact that mixed quotation exhibits symptoms of both regu-
lar language use, and metalinguistic use, or mention. In section 2, I give a
comprehensive overview of the data to establish this paradoxical behavior
empirically. On the one hand, mixed quotation seems to involve verbatim
quotation of part of a previous speech act. One of the basic observations
in the linguistic and philosophical literature on mixed quotation is that it’s
opaque in the sense that changes to the original are not permitted. A much
discussed case in point would be the examples of shifted indexicals in mixed
quotation. The relevant data here typically show mixed quotation patterning
with pure quotation and direct discourse, rather than with indirect discourse.
On the other hand, the literature also presents evidence of mixed quota-
tion behaving more or less transparently and patterning more with indirect
discourse than with direct and pure quotation. A case in point would be
some attested examples where mixed-quoted indexicals are not shifted but
adjusted to the quoting environment, or also the systematic SVO-to-SOV word
order adjustment in Dutch mixed quotes.
To account for all these data, I propose a semantics based on the idea
that a mixed quotation serves to defer the interpretation of an expression or
phrase to a source different from the current speaker. More precisely, “could
care less” in (1c) means what Ann refers to when she said the words ‘could
care less’.
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Taking seriously this “free relative paraphrase”, the first thing to note is
the dependence of mixed quotation on pure quotation. In pure quotation,
an expression in quotation marks refers to that very expression. But what
exactly is this “expression” that a pure quote refers to? a phonological form?
a sequence of letters? a syntactic expression? To spell out a theory of pure
quotation (let alone mixed quotation) we will need to have a grammatical
formalism that is very explicit about these different levels of linguistic form/
meaning, separating phonological surface form, syntax, logical form, and
model-theoretic interpretation. I present a suitable formal grammar with an
account of pure quotation in section 3.
The next step is to extend this grammar to mixed quotation. In section
4, I explore a compositional analysis based on the free relative paraphrase.
In section 5.1 I argue that quotation exhibits precisely the characteristic
projection behavior of presuppositions. This puts the phenomenon out of
reach of a compositional semantics, and necessitates a switch to dynamic
semantics/pragmatics.
Reviewing the empirical coverage of the dynamic presuppositional ac-
count with respect to the data surveyed in section 2, it becomes clear that
the analysis is somewhat skewed toward opacity. In other words, it still has
trouble with transparency symptoms like non-constituent quotations, and
the apparent possibility of various adjustments to the presupposed original
speech acts. I propose that a process of unquotation lies at the root of these
phenomena. In section 6, I enrich the presuppositional approach with an
account of unquotation, and show how this extends our empirical coverage.
2 The paradox of mixed quotation
Davidson 1979 introduced philosophers to an interesting mix of indirect and
direct discourse, which he termed mixed quotation:
(2) Quine said that quotation “has a certain anomalous feature”.
His discussion of this now famous example highlights not only the syntactic
mix of direct and indirect discourse, but also the semantic mix of language
use, associated with indirect discourse, and mention, associated with pure
quotation and direct discourse. The sentence in (2) conveys that Quine said
that quotation has a certain anomalous feature, but in addition it conveys
that Quine uttered these very words. As Davidson put it, a mixed quote does
“double duty” in semantics.
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Since Davidson, a varied corpus of constructed and found mixed quotation
examples has accumulated in the philosophical and linguistic literature on
quotation and reported speech. In this section I provide a comprehensive,
pre-theoretical overview of the prominent data that I will address in the
remainder of the paper. I divide the data up into two main groups: (i) opacity
indicators, which show mixed quotation patterning with direct discourse
and pure quotation as opposed to non-quotative language use (as in indirect
discourse), and (ii) transparency indicators, which show mixed quotation
patterning with indirect discourse.
This method of classification results in an important restriction of the
empirical scope of this paper. I exclude some phenomena that are typically
seen as indicators of transparency, on the basis of the fact that they also
apply to other forms of quotation. This includes well-known cases of ellipsis
and pronouns that appear to get their antecedents from within a mixed
quotation. Toward the end of section 2.2 I observe that this happens with
pure and direct quotations as well, so, although that makes the phenomenon
that much more puzzling and interesting for future research, it is not a
problem to be addressed by a semantics of mixed quotation.
At the end of this section we will have a puzzling mix of characteristics
indicating either transparency or opacity. In the sections to follow I offer
an analysis in three steps: First, I present a general grammatical framework
capable of referring to linguistic objects; then, I model mixed quotation as
a presupposition trigger, predicting all the opacity and some transparency
characteristics below; and finally, I add unquotation to capture the full range
of transparency data.
2.1 Mixed quotation is opaque
Davidson already remarked that mixed quotations convey that the quoted
words were used verbatim. The truth of (3) requires that Perry said or wrote
the exact words contrived phony mess, in that order.
(3) Perry said climate change is a “contrived phony mess”; Perry uttered the words contrived phony mess.
I will refer to this central characteristic of mixed quotation as the verbatim
requirement.
It is important to note that verbatim here is really a vague and context de-
pendent notion. It depends on the contextual standard of precision whether,
7:4
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say, a literal translation in a different language, or a cleaned up version
without pauses, hedges, hesitations and false starts, can count as a verbatim
reproduction. In a colloquial setting where reporter and reportee speak differ-
ent dialects, the contextual standard for verbatimness may be set rather low.
On the other end of the spectrum we find contexts like a scholar scrutinizing
the writings of another scholar, where verbatimness means faithfulness on
a letter-by-letter basis, perhaps even including orthographic/paralinguistic
markings like commas, capitalization, line breaks, and page breaks. In either
case the context determines an equivalence relation between expressions
that count as the same for the purposes of quoting (cf. Bonami & Godard’s
(2008) resemblance relation).
This is not to say that anything goes. Once a contextual standard of
precision is in place, the speaker is committed to that level of verbatimness
of his mixed quotations. It is this commitment that makes it possible for the
hearer to object when she perceives a deviation from the norm:1
(4) A: Bush said he has an “eclectic” reading list.
B: No, that’s not right. He said he has an “eckullectic” reading list.
Such verbatimness objections, known otherwise as metalinguistic negation
(Horn 1989), differentiate between mixed quotation and indirect discourse,
where it’s not the wording (modulo the contextual equivalence relation of
verbatim similarity) but the content that matters.
Similarly, mixed quoting while explicitly denying faithfulness to the origi-
nal wording is unacceptable:2
(5) #Perry said that climate change is a “contrived phony mess”, but he
didn’t use those words.
Again, this differentiates between mixed quotation and plain indirect dis-
course.
1 Cf. Shan’s (2011) (12b) for discussion of a similar observation.
2 A reviewer suggests counterexamples like Perry said that climate change is a “contrived
phony mess”, but he didn’t use those words, because he was speaking French. I am not entirely
convinced that the use of overt quotation marks in this particular version of the example
is warranted, but in any case there remains a contrast between the mixed quotation in (5)
(or the variant above) and its quotation-free counterpart. There are contexts with relatively
high verbatimness thresholds in which: (i) (5) is infelicitous because of a violation of the




I will not explicitly formalize the context dependence of verbatimness.
I simply assume an underlying primitive relation of “samenessc” between
tokens of linguistic surface expressions in a context. We could use this
equivalence to define a more abstract notion of an expression (cf. Shan 2011),
or we could use it to relax our definition of pure quotation (on which, after
all, mixed quotation relies). I will only briefly return to this matter at the very
end of the paper, in section 6.3.
An immediate consequence of the verbatim requirement is opacity in the
logician’s sense of blocking substitution of coreferential terms. The verbatim
requirement would predict that synonyms like buy – purchase can’t be reliably
substituted salva veritate in mixed quotations, even though they can be in
indirect reports. That is, if John said, literally, “Great! I’ll purchase all of it”,
we should be able to detect the following contrast:
(6) a. John said that he wants to “purchase all of it”.
b. #John said that he wants to “buy all of it”.
c. John said he wants to buy all of it.
Given the confounding factor of variable verbatimness thresholds, which
might make (6b) acceptable in some contexts, we should look for some more
robust linguistic tests to detect opacity in mixed quotation. The semantics lit-
erature on context dependence and reported speech provides two main tests:
indexical shift and wh-movement. So let’s see if mixed quotation patterns
with pure/direct quotation or with indirect discourse in these respects.
The classic test for identifying quotation involves the interpretation of
indexicals. According to Kaplan 1989, an indexical like I always refers to
the actual speaker of its utterance. The only apparent exception to this rule
that Kaplan allows is if the indexical is merely mentioned, as in a pure or
direct quotation. Now, the consensus in the literature is that an I in a mixed
quotation need not refer to the actual speaker (e.g., Geurts & Maier 2005,
Cumming 2005, Anand 2006)
(7) Bill Watterson said that reality “continues to ruin my life”.
In a sense, the indexical my in (7) refers to Bill Watterson, rather than to the
actual speaker. The verbatim requirement would explain this indexical shift
behavior — we’re quoting Watterson’s actual words, including his use of the
word my to refer to himself.
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However, we should be careful in concluding opacity from indexical
shifting. Contrary to what Kaplan assumed, it is now widely accepted that
(apparent) indexical shift is not restricted to mere mention of expressions.
Schlenker (1999, 2003) and others have argued that various examples of
shifted indexicals in different languages are best analyzed in terms of “mon-
strous” (= context shifting) operators that have nothing to do with quotation.
The question then arises, could there be a monster hiding in (7)? According
to some accounts, yes, mixed quotation itself introduces a context shifting
operator (Recanati 2000, 2001). On the view I will develop in this paper,
no, the apparent context shift is the result of a genuine quotation operator
inducing a verbatim requirement.
As a side note it is worth pointing out that examples like (7) suffice
to discard truly pragmatic accounts of quotation that say that, semanti-
cally (i.e., as far as truth conditions are concerned), mixed quotation is just
indirect discourse, and the quotation marks are merely adding some non-
truth-conditional information (e.g. Gutzmann & Stei 2011). Clearly, the effect
of mixed quotation is genuinely semantic: (7) has different truth conditions
than the plain variant, Bill Watterson said that reality continues to ruin my life,
which has Watterson talking about me.3 We’ll return to these and other theo-
retical matters below. For now, note that, with respect to indexicals, mixed
quotation is commonly assumed to behave like pure and direct quotation.
The second commonly used linguistic opacity test involves wh-movement.
Genuine quotation, it is said, blocks wh-movement. In the literature this
grammatical aspect of opacity is only explicitly discussed as a constraint
on full direct quotation (Schlenker 1999, Anand & Nevins 2004), but the
discussion by these authors suggests that it applies to mixed quotation as
well (cf. Schlenker’s 2011 formulation: “grammatical dependencies cannot
normally ‘cross’ quotation marks”). To apply this test, consider a case where
someone didn’t quite hear the end of Davidson’s mixed quotation in (2).
There is indeed a clear contrast between the responses in (8).
(8) a. ??What did Quine say quotation “has”?
b. What did Quine say quotation has?
3 Recanati’s (2001) “radical pragmatic” account is not so easily refuted, because in his con-
ception pragmatics does affect truth conditions. Note also that many phenomena that are
pragmatic in the weak sense of “depending on language being situated in context”, such




It looks like mixed quotation again patterns with direct rather than indirect
discourse. However, in section 2.2 I’ll show that the observation in (8) doesn’t
generalize well: mixed quotation sometimes does allow wh-movement, cf.
(21). In fact, I will show there that indexical shifting is not universal either.
Given that indexical shift can have different sources, and that the wh-
criterion is ultimately inconclusive, let’s consider a final opacity test: language
shift. Many researchers have pointed out that direct and mixed quotation,
unlike regular indirect discourse reporting, allows the reporter to slip into
the reported speaker’s idiolect, reproducing any speech disfluencies, typos,
grammar and spelling errors, sociolect, even a completely different language,
without herself being associated with these linguistic peculiarities (Partee
1973, Banfield 1973, Clark & Gerrig 1990, Recanati 2001).
(9) a. It’s a picture of a cat who asks if he can “has cheezburger”.
b. He wrote that Kant was “my wife’s favoritest philososopher”.
c. Palin tweeted that “peaceful Muslims” should “refudiate” the mosque
being built at Ground Zero.4
d. If you were a French academic, you might say that the parrot was




These data, arguably, are the clearest signs that genuine metalinguistic ref-
erence is involved and that mixed quotation patterns more with pure and
direct quotation than with indirect. In addition, since removing the quotation
marks from (9) does not even leave grammatical English sentences, these
examples confirm that mixed quotation is not mere pragmatics, but really
should be considered a part of grammar.
A final lesson to be drawn from language shift phenomena like (9) is
this: If mixed quotation is to be analyzed in terms of a context shifting
operator, it will have to be an operator that shifts not just the context as
represented by a series of parameters from the model (time, place, speaker),
but the language itself. I will not here argue explicitly against introducing
such super-monstrous operators. Instead I merely point out that all the
data presented in this section would follow immediately from associating
a verbatim requirement with mixed quotation. This will therefore be the
starting point of my analysis in section 4.
4 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/19/AR2010071904916.html
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2.2 Mixed quotation is transparent
Mixed quotation shares all of the above characteristics with pure and direct
quotation. We may take this as evidence that mixed-quoted words are men-
tioned as opposed to used. But mixed quotation also shares a number of
characteristics with regular, quotation-less language use.
First, from Davidson’s (1979) seminal paper comes the observation that
mixed quotes do not typically function as referential terms, but can instead
fulfill any role in the clause. To appreciate this observation we need first a
brief look at pure quotation and direct discourse.
A pure quotation functions syntactically as a referential term: one that
refers to the arbitrary piece of linguistic material that is enclosed within
its quotation marks. In direct discourse an entire main clause, or even a
discourse, occupies an NP argument position of a transitive verb of saying
(Mary said {this, something, “Hey, get out of here!”}). In both direct and pure
quotation the quotation marks thus signify a syntactic operator that turns
any underlying piece of language into an NP. I’ll make this more precise in
section 3. In the case of mixed quotation, by contrast, the quotation has the
same grammatical role as the underlying fragment without the quotation
marks.
(10) Perry said that climate change is a “contrived phony mess”.
The phrase contrived phony mess itself is a common noun phrase, N.5 The
quotation in (10) fills the same slot as the phrase without the quotation
marks would, and hence must be an N as well. Since no NP can replace the
quoted phrase in (10), mixed quotation is truly different from pure and direct
quotation.
(11) *Perry said that climate change is a [NP { this / the words ‘contrived
phony mess’ } ].
One way of putting it is that, unlike in direct discourse and pure quotation,
the syntax doesn’t see the quotation marks. A mixed quotation has the
same internal structure as the constituent quoted, and that structure is
fully incorporated in the larger structure provided by the reporting sentence
environment.




A more extreme variant of this grammatical incorporation aspect of mixed
quotation is found in so-called non-constituent quotations.





The quoted segment in (12) is not by itself a well-formed grammatical con-
stituent on any independently motivated syntactic theory. Rather, despite the
quotation marks, strange things functions as the direct object of ate, together
forming the VP ate strange things, which is then modified by when left to its
own devices.6
In some other examples, it may be syntactically possible to analyze the
mixed quote as a single constituent, but doing so would lead to an unintended
interpretation. (13) is a case in point:
(13) The menu says that this restaurant serves “breakfast at any time”.7
In (13), breakfast at any time may be a analyzed as a syntactic constituent in
some contexts (breakfast at noon is better than lunch at 8AM), but, semanti-
cally, at any time in this particular context is intended to modify the serving,
rather than the just the breakfast.
Quantifier raising has also been used to bring out the transparency of
mixed quotation. In the intended interpretation of (14), the embedded uni-
versal quantifier takes scope over the existential.
6 There are few if any purely syntactic restrictions on what can be mixed-quoted. Maier 2008
discusses mixed quotation starting subclausally but spanning multiple sentences, and even
mixed quotation below the word level:
(i) a. Pascal suspected that the mercury was really supported by the “weight and
pressure of the air, because I consider them only as a particular case of a
universal principle concerning the equilibriums of fluids.”
b. Mary said that the stalag“mites” were about to fall from the ceiling.
7 This is actually the set up of a Steven Wright joke, which continues, so I ordered French
toast during the Renaissance. Interestingly, the joke partly depends on interpreting the
quotation as a single constituent and the parallel misconstruction this makes available for
the punchline: . . . [ ordered [ French toast during the Renaissance ] ]. However, as always with
jokes: does the fact that you can get this reading here show that it is linguistically felicitous
to analyze the quotation as a single constituent, or does the fact that it’s funny show that it
isn’t?
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(14) The dean asked that a student “accompany every professor”.[
(Cumming 2005)
]
Again, on purely syntactic grounds, the mixed quote in (14) could well be
a constituent, but analyzing it semantically as a single constituent would
give us the property of accompanying every professor as interpretation.
Combining this property with the denotation of the subject (a student) gives
us the strong ∃∀ reading, but cannot give us the intended inverse scope
reading.
Just like the obvious non-constituent quotation in (12), the mixed quo-
tations in (13) and (14) cannot be treated as single constituents that get
interpreted as a unit, let alone as a referential NP. In this respect mixed
quotation behaves differently from pure and direct quotation.
The data in this subsection so far show syntactic transparency, i.e., the
syntax here seems oblivious to the quotation marks. But we have not yet
seen a direct contradiction of the semantic opacity induced by the verbatim
requirement from section 2.1 above. In the remainder of this section we
turn to aspects of apparently transparent integration that do contradict the
verbatim requirement and thereby pose a significant threat to the type of
analysis alluded to at the end of section 2.1.
A first example comes from Dutch, a language where word order marks
the difference between a main clause and a subordinate clause (e.g., indi-
rect discourse complement). As it turns out, this word order adjustment is
mandatory, even if it parts of the subordinate clause are mixed-quoted. Take





















‘I’ll give that idiot a taste of his own medicine.’
To report (15) in indirect discourse I’d have to switch to SOV, but if object
and verb are mixed-quoted this contradicts the verbatim requirement. In-
terestingly, as far as I can tell introspectively, the word order adjustment
requirement in Dutch always beats the verbatim requirement:












































‘John says he’ll “give that idiot a taste of his own medicine”.’
Grammatical gender agreement works similarly. Shan 2011 provides the fol-
















‘Italian men look very cute to me.’
I want to report Ken, mixed quoting the part around cute, but paraphrasing
Italian men with an expression that happens to have a different grammatical
gender. Shan observes that it is impossible to retain the original gender on
the adjective in the new environment. Instead we have to adjust it to agree























‘Ken said that Italian people “look very cute to me”.’
In both cases the quoted fragment is modified from the original to con-
form morphosyntactically to the surrounding indirect discourse embedding.
This is in direct contradiction with the verbatim requirement identified in the
previous subsection. What’s more, these adjustments appear to be manda-
tory. This last fact shows that the adjustments cannot be explained away as
the result of a contextually low verbatimness threshold which does not care
about word order. We can apply the tests discussed at the top of section 2.1
above to prove this. Observe, for instance, that there is no context, no matter
how precise its citation practices, in which one can felicitously object to and
“correct” a Dutch report’s adjusted word order:
(19) *Nee dat klopt niet. Jan zegt dat hij “zal die idioot een koekje van eigen
deeg geven”.
‘No, that’s not right. Jan says that he “will that idiot a taste of his own
medicine give”.’
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In light of this evidence of transparent integration of mixed quote and
surroundings, it is worth reconsidering the evidence from the previous sub-
section where I reviewed some evidence that mixed quotations were not so
fully integrated in their quoting environments. A closer look at the data
reveals that there are indeed counterexamples to the observed indexical
shifting, and the blocking of wh-movement.
In 2.1 I suggested that the indexical shift behavior may be derived from
the verbatim requirement. However, it turns out there are many examples of
mixed quotations in which an original indexical pronoun is adjusted to the
quoting environment and replaced with, for instance, a third person pronoun
or another indexical. For instance, in (20) we see the following adjustments:
our → its, I → he, and your → my.
(20) a. The row over the EU’s plan to label tar sands oil as highly pol-
luting escalates as Canada says it “will not hesitate to defend its
interests”.8
b. When asked, Bob Dylan said that he continues his music career
because “he made a vow years ago, he sold his soul and must
keep up to his end of the bargain.”9
c. And then they told me to “stick a lamp up my ass”.10
Another clear violation of the strict verbatim requirement involves wh-
movement out of a mixed quote:
(21) Who did Mary say that she would “never misunderestimate ever
again”?
In contrast with the superficial adjustments in (15)–(18), the ones in (20)–(21)
actually affect the semantic interpretation. In the pronoun adjustment cases
in (20) moreover the alternative versions with the verbatim indexicals in the
quote would be more or less acceptable as well.
(22) And then they told me to “stick a lamp up your ass”.
I conclude that mixed-quoted pronouns seem to allow both transparent




10 Example taken from Maier 2006.
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possible, although the example from 2.1 shows that quotation does impose
some restrictions. These are some of the most challenging aspects for a
uniform formal theory — and ones that have not been properly addressed
before. I’ll return to this matter at the end of the paper, in section 6.
To sum up, mixed quotation is transparent in the following senses:
(i) it preserves syntactic structure, and (ii) it allows various adjustments
to the quoted original to better integrate it into the new reporting con-
struction. These adjustments come in two distinct varieties: (a) obligatory
syntactico–phonological adjustments (word order, grammatical gender), and
(b) (optional/restricted) syntactico–semantic adjustments (pronouns, wh-
movement).
A note on pragmatic transparency
In section 2.2 above I discussed the interaction between quote and sur-
roundings at the phonology–syntax–semantics interfaces. There is also more
pragmatic evidence that points to transparent language use rather then mere
metalinguistic reference. For instance, it’s commonly assumed that from a
mixed quote we typically infer the indirect discourse counterpart (Davidson
1979, Cappelen & Lepore 1997). This, concretely, predicts the infelicity of (23),
unless the context is specifically set up for us to expect that Perry’s words
may have different meanings than the reporter’s.
(23) #?Perry said that climate change is a “contrived phony mess” but he
didn’t say that it’s a contrived phony mess.
Furthermore, anaphoric pronouns and ellipsis can pick up antecedents in-
troduced within a mixed quotation, indicating that the quoted material is
not inertly presented as linguistic object in its own right, but is actually
interpreted.
(24) a. Mary said that she is “bestest friends with the manager” at her
work, so she’s confident he’ll give her a raise.
b. Our CEO likes to say that in her company “everybody loves their
job”, but I really don’t.
However, we should be careful in drawing conclusions from (23) and (24)
because these data don’t provide a clear contrast with direct discourse, or
even pure quotation: (25a) suggests that even pure quotation may trigger a
7:14
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use inference; (25b) that it allows the establishment of anaphoric and elliptical
dependencies.
(25) a. #The opening statement of his speech included the sentence ‘Cli-
mate change is a contrived phony mess’, but he didn’t say that
climate change is a contrived phony mess.





In light of this pattern I would like to suggest that there is a more general
mechanism at play, one that transcends the opacity of even pure quotation.
Rather than encoding this type of transparency into the semantics of pure,
direct and/or mixed quotes, I will conservatively maintain that the infer-
ence to indirect discourse and the penetration of anaphora and ellipsis into
quotation is a truly pragmatic effect.
Compare the situation to the phenomenon of bridging:
(26) John was killed yesterday. The gun lay nearby.
No gun has been mentioned before the second sentence, so the familiarity
presupposition triggered by the definite description the gun is not satisfied.
The reason we can still use that description is that we can infer a relevant
gun based on the first sentence (and world-knowledge about killing, and
guns). Crucially, this inference, or implicature according to Grice 1989, is not
part of the truth conditions of the first sentence. It is a piece of defeasible
information added to the semantic contribution of the whole two-sentence
discourse to ensure its coherence.
I assume that something similar is going on with anaphora into quotation:
on pains of incoherence, a pragmatic repair is executed or an implicature is
drawn. Instead of lexical/world knowledge, it may be simply the phonological
resemblance between a phrase and its pure-quoted counterpart that facilitates
the use inference and consequent introduction of appropriate discourse
referents.11
11 A reviewer points out it is far from clear if a story along these lines will work for the ellipsis
observed in (24b), because it is well-known that ellipsis, unlike “deep” pronominal anaphora,
cannot get an antecedent derived pragmatically from the context (Hankamer & Sag 1976).
Since I intend to put the whole discussion of anaphora into quotations aside anyway, I will
leave it at this for now.
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As stated at the outset of this section I restrict attention to aspects of
transparency that clearly distinguish mixed from pure and direct quotation,
and therefore leave a detailed analysis of pragmatic transparency of direct,
mixed and pure quotation for a future occasion.
Summary
I close this section with a schematic summary of the data reviewed. I present
two lists of the most salient opacity and transparency indicators and illustrate
them by repeating some of the key examples. I add references to sections
below where I formally analyze the empirical phenomenon in question.
Opacity: mixed quotation ≈ direct discourse and pure quotation
• verbatim requirement
(5) *Perry said climate change is a “contrived phony mess”, but he
didn’t use those words.
• indexical shift [cf. section 4.2]
(7) Bill Watterson said that reality “continues to ruin my life”.
• language shift [cf. section 4.2]
(9) Palin tweeted that “peaceful Muslims” should “refudiate” the
mosque being built at Ground Zero.
Transparency: mixed quotation ≈ indirect discourse and regular use
• grammatical incorporation [cf. section 4.1]
• non-constituent quotation





(14) The dean asked that a student “accompany every professor”.[
cf. section 6.3
]
• morphosyntactic adjustment [cf. section 6.3]
(16b) Jan zegt dat hij “die idioot een koekje van eigen deeg zal
geven”.
7:16
Mixed quotation: The grammar of apparently transparent opacity
• indexical adjustment [cf. section 6.2]
(20c) And then they told me to “stick a lamp up my ass”.
• movement out of quotation [cf. section 6.3]
(21) Who did Mary say that she would “never misunderestimate
ever again”?
3 A grammatical framework for metalinguistic reference
This paper is about the semantics of mixed quotation. As announced, the
guiding idea is that this meaning can be captured by the free relative para-
phrase:
(27) J“an anomalous feature”K = what x referred to with his utterance of
the phrase ‘an anomalous feature’
In the definiens I refer to a piece of linguistic material via a pure quote. So to
make (27) precise and evaluate it properly, we need first of all to understand
how pure quotation works. In this section I propose a general grammatical
framework for representing the phonology–syntax–semantics interfaces, in
which we can formulate an account of pure quotation.
As a notational convention I will use single quotation marks for pure
quotation, and double quotation marks for mixed quotation in examples and
formal systems. In the running text I will often use italics for a variety of
quotational and emphatic purposes.
3.1 Remarks on pure quotation
Pure quotation is so-called because it involves only metalinguistic reference.
A pure quotation refers to a series of words or letters, viz., the very same
words or letters that are contained in the quotation.
In philosophical logic, there is a venerable tradition of studying the
semantics of pure quotation.12 Of particular interest to these philosophers
is the observed opacity of this type of quotation, i.e., the fact that inside a
quotation, even synonyms cannot be substituted for one another without
changing the meaning.




‘Cicero’ has six letters
Cicero = Tully
therefore: ‘Tully’ has six letters
My formalization of pure quotation is based on the so-called Disquota-
tional Schema:
(29) if α is an arbitrary expression, then ‘α’ is a referring expression, andJ‘α’K = α
This principle presupposes (i) that linguistic expressions are part of our
semantic domains (α functions as a denotation and as an expression in the
equation in (29)), and (ii) that quotation is not compositional in the classical
sense (the denotation of ‘α’ does not depend on the denotation of α but on
α itself).13
There’s one more thing we need to clear up before we can formalize. We
have been talking about expressions being quoted, but what is an expression?
Do we quote phonological representations, actual spoken or written tokens, or
abstract expressions? Philosophers have long observed that we can quote not
just grammatically wellformed English phrases, but also gibberish, sometimes
with phonological properties (‘sklat’ rhymes with ‘mat’), sometimes with
graphemic properties (‘tsx’ has 3 letters), or even gestures, facial expressions,
sounds or symbols. However, what I am after in this paper is a semantics of
mixed quotation, and, as will become apparent along the way, the range of
things that can be mixed-quoted is decidedly more restricted. In the formal
system below I won’t bother with gestures and the like. I’ll assume, for
simplicity, that what can be quoted can be represented as strings of letters
in some finite alphabet.
3.2 From phonology to syntax
In the picture of grammar that we’ll be considering in detail below, we
have a syntactic quotation operator that is phonetically realized as a distinct
quotation intonation, italics, or quotation marks, and semantically interpreted
as an identity function on expressions. Let’s first take a close look at the
syntax–phonology interface.
13 Cf. Maier 2014 for a detailed discussion of the disquotational semantics of pure quotation
assumed here.
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On the basis of the discussion above we assume a syntactic phrase struc-
ture tree like this:







In this tree, has six letters is a VP, denoting a property, and ‘Cicero’, the
quotation, is an NP, denoting the enclosed linguistic expression Cicero. But
what is the syntactic status of the terminal node Cicero? In this example it
too is an NP, the proper name of a certain orator. In general, any complex or
atomic symbol can be quoted, meaningful or not.
I assume a fixed finite alphabet of symbols such that at least all well-
formed phonologically spelled out expressions of the languages under con-
sideration can be represented as finite strings of letters from this alphabet.
Call this alphabet A, and the set of finite strings over A, A∗. At a phonological
level, English may be equated with a certain subset of A∗. Note that there are
many ungrammatical, unpronounceable, and/or meaningless strings in A∗
(he sleeps him, misunderestimate, hrmpf, F+6O0)5ay).
We could add purely phonological constraints to capture English more
accurately, but for simplicity we stick with written language that is, at a
purely phonological level, closed under string concatenation. In other words,
we have a composition principle that says that we can concatenate (∩) any
two strings of letters into a larger one:
(31) If σ,τ ∈ Lphon(= A∗), then σ∩τ ∈ Lphon
To capture the set of grammatically well-formed expressions, we are going
to add a layer of syntactic structure. Following Potts 2007 and Shan 2011,
I’ll use a categorial grammar formalism. Let CAT be the set of categories
generated by a simple categorial grammar with basic categories N,NP,S and
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a left (\) and right slash (/).14 At a syntactic level, English may be equated
with a subset of A∗ × CAT. Call this set Lsyn. A categorial grammar will
generate Lsyn on the basis of a finite lexicon (32a) and some category-driven














b. rules: 〈σ∩τ ; B〉
〈σ ; A〉 〈τ ; A\B〉
〈σ∩τ ; B〉
〈σ ; B/A〉 〈τ ; A〉
. . .
The syntax of pure quotation can be stated as a special composition principle










Essentially, pure quotation thus becomes a way of incorporating merely











has six letters ; NP\S
∂
To recap, we have now two levels of description of language. At the
phonological level, composition is concatenation. At the syntactic level, we
add a category label to each phonological element, and let composition be
determined by a categorial grammar.
A note on notation: in the following I will abbreviate NP\S as VP in trees,
and omit concatenation symbols in composition rules.
14 The category “under” the slash represents what can be taken as input, the category “over”
the slash indicates what the output would be. For example, an NP/S takes a sentence to the
right and, by concatenation in that order, forms an NP.
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3.3 Semantics as a third dimension
Semantics adds a third dimension to the grammar. The language from a
semantic point of view (Lsem) consists of triples containing a phonological
component, a category, and a semantic object. In a truly compositional model,
we would take set-theoretic entities of the appropriate logical type as our
semantic objects.
In my eventual analysis of mixed quotation, however, I will introduce
pragmatic manipulations at an intermediate representational level between
language and interpretation. For this reason, instead of building set-theoretic
entities into our language, I opt for expressions in some interpreted for-
mal language which represent such objects. This way, we reserve room
for a fourth, non-compositional level of linguistic interpretation, that is,
a pragmatic system that takes care of, say, presupposition resolution and
implicature computation.
So, let L be an interpreted, higher-order, typed logical language suitable
for doing Montagovian compositional semantics. That is, we have two types
e, t, corresponding to the basic domains of individuals (De = D) and truth
values (Dt = {0,1}). Complex types correspond to functional domains, e.g.,
Det contains the functions from De to Dt (i.e., characteristic functions of
subsets of D). The semantic interpretation function, J K, first maps the basic
expressions of type τ in L to elements in Dτ , and is then extended to complex
expressions. Furthermore, by a recursive definition each category can be
mapped onto a corresponding type, e.g., N/N → (et)et, so every lexical item
in Lsyn can be mapped to an expression in L of the corresponding type,
and from there to a functional semantic object. Again, we can recursively
extend this mapping to all complex expressions in Lsyn. For uniformity, we








walk ; NP\S ; walk
∂
,. . .
b. rules: 〈σ∩τ ; B ; β(α)〉
〈σ ; A ; α〉 〈τ ; A\B ; β〉
〈σ∩τ ; B ; α(β)〉
〈σ ; B/A ; α〉 〈τ ; A ; β〉
. . .
To formulate a pure quotation rule, we need to enrich L with a device for
metalinguistic reference. First, phonetic strings should be objects in our
model, so we add Lphon to De. Then we define: If α ∈ Lphon then [α\ is an
expression of type e. Finally, J[α\K = α.
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‘σ ’ ; NP ; [σ\
∂
σ




‘Cicero’ has six letters ; S ; SixLettr([Cicero\)
∂
¨




has six letters ; NP\S ; λx[SixLettr(x)]
∂
The top node gives us the logical form of the sentence, which we can interpret
in a model:
(38) ‘Cicero’ has six letters.
a. logical form: SixLettr([Cicero\)
b. truth conditions: J(38a)K = 1 iff
iff J[Cicero\K ∈ JSixLettrK
iff Cicero is a member of the set of six-letter objects
4 Mixed quotation at the syntax–semantics interface
The main goal of this section is to extend our three-dimensional formal
grammar to deal with the syntax and semantics of mixed quotation as in:
(39) Perry said that climate change is a “contrived phony mess.”
[=(10)]
15 Nothing prevents us from introducing composition rules for quoting the higher dimensional
expressions of Lsyn or Lsem. In fact, Potts’s (2007) semantics of pure quotation does the
latter:
One problem that I’ll touch on in section 4 is that this restricts the application of pure
quotation to grammatically well-formed and semantically interpretable expressions. I’ll
return to the intermediate option of applying pure quotation to Lsyn in section 6.3.
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Syntactically, our starting point is the grammatical incorporation of a mixed
quote observed in section 2.2: when we have a grammatical common noun
phrase like contrived phony mess (referring to a property, via a logical expres-
sion of type et), its mixed quotation “contrived phony mess” is also a common
noun phrase. Semantically, the basic idea is the free relative paraphrase:
(40) Perry said that climate change is a what he referred to as ‘contrived
phony mess’
Section 4.1 deals with the basic syntax of mixed quotation, section 4.2
presents a compositional semantics inspired by the free relative paraphrase.
4.1 The syntax of mixed quotation
At the surface phonological level we indicate mixed quotation by enclosing a
sequence of letters within double quotation mark symbols. At the syntactic
level mixed quotations can be constituents of any category. In the climate
change example above, the indefinite determiner, of category NP/N, indicates
that the quotation that follows it must be of category N. Moreover, a quota-
tion like “contrived phony mess” is clearly not a primitive lexical item, but
consist of quotation marks applied to the underlying constituent, contrived
phony mess. This constituent, taken on its own, is also of category N, being
composed of two N/N adjectives (contrived, phony) and a noun (mess):












phony mess” ; N
∑≠
contrived












We capture the syntax of mixed quotation generally with the following Lsyn
composition rule (where C stands for an arbitrary syntactic category):
(42) 〈“σ” ; C〉
〈σ ; C〉
This rule implies that, as far as syntax is concerned, there are two differences
between pure and mixed quotes: (i) while pure quotation can apply to an
arbitrary string in Lphon, mixed quotation can only take a full syntactic ex-
pression in Lsyn; and (ii), while pure quotes are always NPs, mixed quotations
can be of any category, for they take on the category of the constituent
expression.
These predictions are borne out: We cannot mixed quote gibberish (43a);
and a mixed-quoted constituent like refutation of category N, doesn’t fit into
a position that wants a transitive verb (43b).
(43) a. *John said that Mary “bishdabcah” him
b. *John said that Mary “refutation” him
Important exceptions are “near words” such as blends (refudiate) and
spelling/pronunciation errors (philtosopher) which are strictly speaking not
English words, yet can occur in mixed quotations:
(44) Palin said that they should “refudiate” the mosque being built.
I submit that (44) is only acceptable when it is common ground that the
reporter and her audience know, or can figure out from context and/or
morphology, that refudiate here is syntactically a transitive verb.
This raises important questions. Is a blend like refudiate part of Lsyn or
Lsem? And what concept of language are we modeling here? Cutting short
a long philosophical debate, I take our formal grammars Lsyn and Lsem as
representing the language spoken by the speech participants, i.e., the common
language between speaker and hearer. To recognize (44) as a grammatical
sentence, the speech participants must be able to construe refudiate as a




is part of Lsyn, our
formal model of the syntax of their common language. However, (44) is
perfectly acceptable if its speaker and hearer do not agree or even have a clue
what that word means — in a sense that is precisely why the speaker of (44)
uses mixed quotation in the first place. Formally, this means that there need
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not be a term
¨
refudiate ; VP/NP ; . . .
∂
in Lsem. This of course has important
consequences for formulating the semantics of mixed quotation, and I will
return to this discussion at the end of the next section.
Finally, I should point out that the proposed syntactic rule does not handle
the non-constituent mixed quotations of section 2.2. There are a number
of ways to overcome this restriction, such as adopting a grammar with a
more flexible notion of constituency or allowing quotations to be broken into
constituent pieces. I return to this matter in section 6.
4.2 A compositional semantics for mixed quotation
The core of my proposal is the idea that the semantic contribution of a
mixed-quoted constituent σ is as follows:
(45) J“σ”K ≈ whatever some salient speaker x referred to when she uttered
σ
To model (45) we need a way to represent the free relative clause and a
predicate that relates phonological expressions and meanings.
Let’s say we analyze the free relative as a definite description, which we
represent with an ιoperator. To relate forms and meanings assume a three-
place predicate E that associates an individual and a phonological expression





≈ the X that the source x expressed with her use of the phonological
string σ
We’ll assume that x, the variable denoting the source of the quote, is of type
e. In this section, we’ll just leave it as a free variable to be filled in by the
context. The second argument of E is the name of a linguistic entity σ , which
in the language L of section 3 is an expression of type e as well. The variable
X in (46), and hence the definite description as a whole, does not have a fixed
type. It is supposed to represent the semantic object that the source referred
to when she uttered σ . The type of X thus depends on the syntactic category
of σ in the original utterance.
Adding (46) as a third dimension to the syntax of section 4.1 would give













Let me illustrate the new composition principle with our example. As-



















“contrived phony mess” ; N ;
ιX
[
E(x, [ contrivedphony mess \,X)
] 〉≠
contrived












Composing these triples in accordance with our Lsem composition rules and
applying λ-conversions at each node to simplify the logical representations
will eventually give the following semantic representation in the top node of





E(x, [contrived phony mess\,X)
]ò
(c)
≈ climate change has the property that x expressed with contrived
phony mess
In the remainder of this subsection I’ll flesh out this proposal in more de-
tail by being more precise about the interpretation of the definite description
operator ι, and about what happens when a clause like that analyzed above
is embedded in an indirect speech reporting construction.
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Definite descriptions as definedness conditions
If a mixed quotation is analyzed as a free relative, and that in turn as a definite
description, how do we interpret definite descriptions? Answer: definite
descriptions are presupposition triggers. Both The King of France is bald and
The King of France is not bald presuppose that there is a King of France. On
the traditional (Frege–Strawson) conception of presupposition this means that
these sentences have no truth value unless there is a unique King of France. To
model this compositionally we assume that the King of France is interpreted
as referring to the unique individual that satisfies the predicate King of
France, if there is such a unique satisfier, and is undefined otherwise. Equating
definedness conditions and presupposition we can then say that indeed
the King of France presupposes the existence of a unique King of France.
Moreover, applying the predicate is bald preserves the definedness condition,
so the sentence the King of France is bald presupposes that — is only defined
if — there is a King of France. Finally, to model the fact that presupposition
is preserved under negation and other sentential embeddings, we need to
assume a logic where undefinedness is passed on at every composition.16
On that assumption, any more complex sentence containing the trigger (e.g.,
Perhaps not everyone agrees that the King of France is not bald) likewise
presupposes that there is a unique King of France — presuppositions project
out of embeddings.
If we want to talk about presupposition and assertion as two dimensions
of meaning we’d say that the King of France is bald presupposes that there is a
King of France and asserts that he is bald. A crucial feature of presupposition
is that generally the assertion dimension asymmetrically depends on the
presupposition dimension.17
Before moving to a more sophisticated analysis of presupposition in
section 5 let’s see how far we can get with the traditional implementation of
presupposition as projecting definedness conditions in a static compositional
framework.
Above we had already reduced the meaning of a mixed quote to a ι-term
in L. The compositional presuppositional analysis of definite descriptions
provides the following model-theoretic interpretation:
16 A three-valued logic known as the Weak Kleene system.
17 Hence, von Fintel 2004a uses the term 1.5-dimensional to distinguish a presuppositional
account from a genuine two-dimensional account like Potts 2007. To stress the same contrast,
Geurts & Maier 2005 even called their presuppositional account one-dimensional.
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(50) J ιX.E(x, [σ\,X)K=

the unique P such that JE(x, [σ\,X)KX,P = 1,
if there is such a unique P
undefined otherwise
Applied to the climate change example, this means that “contrived phony
mess” triggers the existential presupposition that someone used the quoted
words to refer to some property X, while contributing X to the assertion,
or, to switch to more neutral modern terminology, to the at-issue content.
So, following the derivation in (48)–(49), we interpret the logical form of the
embedded clause as follows:
(51) J[ ιX[E(x, [contrived phony mess\,X)]](c)K =
=

undefined if there is no unique P withJE(x, [contrived phony mess\,X)KX,P = 1,
1 if JcK ∈ P0, where P0 is the unique P withJE(x, [contrived phony mess\,X)KX,P = 1,
0 otherwise
In a readable two-dimensional paraphrase:
(52) climate change is a “contrived phony mess”
presupposition: there is an X such that x uttered the words ‘con-
trived phony mess’ to refer to X
at-issue: climate change is X
We predict that the metalinguistic presupposition triggered by a mixed
quotation always projects. So our climate change report as a whole will
presuppose that — only have a truth value if — the quoted phrase was uttered,
and moreover expressed something. To substantiate that I will give you a
semantics of saying that below, but first, it’s worth pointing out that the
proposed semantic contribution of mixed quotation does not depend on a
reportive indirect discourse embedding at all.
Non-reportive mixed quotation
A major benefit of the current approach is that it’s completely independent of
the indirect speech construction. Out of the box it gives accurate predictions
for those cases of mixed quotation that are not so embedded. Take the
example above. We have analyzed the clause climate change is a “contrived
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phony mess” as a step toward deriving the truth conditions of the mixed
quotational report Perry said that climate change is a “contrived phony mess”,
but we can well imagine the clause as a standalone sentence, perhaps uttered
in a context where it is clear what source of the quote is intended. Below are
some more non-reportive variations on mixed quotes from section 2:
(53) a. For Quine, quotation is interesting because it has “a certain
anomalous feature”.
b. John tends to “misunderestimate” his opponent.
Applying our analysis so far, we derive the right interpretations, viz. quotation
is interesting for Quine because it has what he referred as ‘an anomalous
feature’.
In both examples in (53) the likely sources are named within the same
sentence. This is certainly not always the case. Especially in non-reportive
quotations the source may be entirely implicit, or even generic. Take (54):
(54) “Extinct” pygmy elephants have been found living on Borneo
Who in the context used the term ‘extinct’ to talk about pygmy elephants? A
particular misinformed source, or just anyone interested in pygmy elephants
until recently? With cases like (54) we seem to be gradually moving from
genuine quotation into scare quoting. I leave for future research the question
of how far we can extend the mixed quotation analysis to cover scare quotes
uniformly (cf. Geurts & Maier 2005, Recanati 2008).
It may seem as if the possibility of choosing an implicit source from
the context differentiates non-reportive from reportive mixed quotation,
because in reportive mixed quotation we can identify the source with the
overt grammatical matrix subject. Note however that even within reports, the
source of a quotation and the subject of an embedding report construction
may come apart:
(55) Ellen: The Godfather II is a total snooze.
Frank: Well, Pauline Kael said that this “total snooze” is a defining




In (55), Frank is quoting Ellen, while reporting what Pauline Kael said.
Before turning to indirect discourse let’s briefly consider some simpler
embeddings of non-reportive quotations. Our presuppositional analysis pre-
dicts projection out of any such embedding. Take negation. Imagine someone
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saying (56) in a debate about politics and climate change with the reporter
who just uttered the original mixed report about Perry’s views:
(56) But climate change is not a “contrived phony mess.”
Intuitively, the speaker of (56) quotes Perry’s actual utterance, as did the
speaker of the original mixed report. Despite the negation taking scope over
the quoted phrase, the presupposition of (56) will be satisfied by the same
contextually salient utterance of Perry as that of the original report. And this
is precisely what we predict: (56) as a whole presupposes that this phrase was
used, to refer to some property, and it asserts that climate change does not
have that property. In other words, negation does not affect the metalinguistic
contribution at all, but targets only at-issue content.
In section 5 we’ll look at some special cases where, under pragmatic
pressure, quotational presuppositions appear not to project or project only
partially. This necessitates a more sophisticated presupposition theory. For
now, note that the current, compositional analysis at least does the right
predictions with respect to (56) in the context of the original report.
Interpreting indirect discourse
Now let’s return to the original report example. To extend the derivation of
the embedded clause in (48) to the entire sentence we need a syntax and
semantics for indirect discourse say. I will follow the traditional analysis
of Kaplan 1989, which analyzes indirect discourse say as an intensional
operator. To implement that, we need first of all to enrich our model theory
by adding two dimensions of interpretation: possible world/time indices
(w ∈ W ) and contexts of utterance (c ∈ C = D ×W ).
(57) If α is of type τ , then JαKc,fw ∈ Dτ (= the interpretation of α uttered in
c and evaluated at w, relative to assignment f )
To quantify over possible worlds, we need intensional expressions in L, and
hence an intensional type s (i.e., Ds = W ). I’ll use the ∧-notation to create
intensions:
(58) If α is of type τ , then ∧α is of type 〈s, τ〉, and J∧αKc,fw is the function
that maps every v ∈ W to JαKc,fv
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that∩σ ; S ; ∧ϕ
∂¨
that ; S/S ; 
∂ ¨




say ; VP/S ; say(st)et
∂
∈ Lsem
b. Jsay(∧ϕ)(ξ)Kc,fw = 1
iff ξ uttered a sentence that expressed, in its utterance con-
text, a proposition that entails the proposition currently
expressed by the report complement ∧ϕ
iff there is a
¨
σ ; S ; ψ
∂
∈ Lsem s.t. f(ξ) uttered σ in w andJ∧ψKc′,fw ⊆ J∧ϕKc,fw , where c′ = 〈f(ξ),w〉












Using our compositional presupposition theory and the semantics of say,
we can compute the interpretation of this logical form. The result, in words:J(61)Kc,fw is undefined, if f(x) did not utter ‘contrived phony mess’ to refer to
some unique property. Otherwise, true if Perry uttered a σ that expressed, in
its utterance context, a proposition that entails that climate change has the
property that f(x) referred to as ‘contrived phony mess’. Assume, finally, that
the context here allows us to infer that the source of the quote (represented
by the free variable x) is the reported speaker, i.e., f(x) =Perry. We then get
a good reconstruction of the free relative paraphrase, complete with the pro-
jected metalinguistic presupposition that Perry used these words verbatim.
Moreover, we’ve managed to achieve this completely compositionally.
4.3 Opacity and mixed quotation
The proposal detailed above already predicts most of the quotational charac-
teristics discussed in 2. In particular, the grammatical incorporation of mixed
quotation (discussed in section 2.2, p. 9), for that was really our starting




point for the syntax and semantics of mixed quotation proposed in this
section. In addition, we capture the verbatim requirement. The reason is that
a reference to the exact quoted phrase features in our E(xpress) relation. Part
of the meaning of a mixed-quoted phrase is the presupposition that x used
the quoted phrase (to refer to X), i.e., E(x, [σ\,X). If the quotation doesn’t
match the actual utterance, this statement will be false and hence the whole
ιexpression will not refer. The verbatim requirement in turn implies the rest
of the opacity features identified in section 2.1, such as the non-adjustment
(semantic shifting) of language and indexicality.
Language shift
Let me illustrate the potential of the current approach for dealing with opacity
features by analyzing an example that involves both idiolectal and indexical
shifting:
(62) Joe complained that Mary “refudiated my faith”.
As observed in 4.1, a creative or accidental blend like refudiate is not really
a word, it has no (or need not have a) determinate lexical meaning in the
language of the reporter and her audience. In (62), we can, however, recognize
it as a transitive verb, syntactically. In our grammar this means we may form
the VP refudiated my faith in Lsyn, if not in Lsem. This syntactic VP can then
be mixed-quoted and used as a meaningful expression in Lsem, with the
deferential interpretation the property that x referred to as ‘refudiated my
faith’ as its meaning coordinate. The crucial part of the derivation is this:
(63)
Æ
Mary “refudiated my faith” ; S ;[









“refudiated my faith” ; VP ;
ιX[E(x, [refudiated my faith\,X)]
∏
¨
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Continuing the derivation with the indirect reporting construction yields the
following eventual truth conditions for (62): John complained that Mary has
the (presupposed) property that he referred to as refudiated my faith.
These truth conditions seem indeed quite plausible. It correctly predicts
that John must have uttered, literally, refudiated my faith. Moreover, he must
have used it to express something, viz. a property (et). The semantics of the
report leaves it wide open what property that may have been, the property of
refuting John’s religious beliefs, perhaps? The reporter is not herself using
the words in the quotation marks in her own Lsem; she is using them to defer
to John by pure quoting what he said. Hence the possibility of quoting things
in different languages, dialects or idiolects. The only restriction comes from
the fact that mixed quotations are grammatically incorporated: in order to
mixed quote an expression, we must recognize the syntax (and hence the
semantic type). In other words, a mixed-quoted expression must be part of
the quoter’s Lsyn. Ultimately, it depends on the speech participants’ shared
assumptions about language what they count as belonging to Lsyn, and hence
what they can mixed quote in their full, interpreted language Lsem.
Indexical shift
Now for the indexical shift. In most contexts it is not unreasonable to expect
that John’s idiolect is sufficiently similar to ours that he uses the pronoun
my to refer to himself, John. VPs that contain such a my, like refudiate my
faith, will then express a property that incorporates a relation to John, e.g.,
the property of repudiating John’s faith. Hence the appearance of indexical
shifting noted in section 2.1.
It is important to note that, unlike truly monstrous indexical shifting such
as that claimed for Amharic (Schlenker 2003, Anand 2006), this shifting is not
semantic in nature. What the mixed quotation semantics tells us is that these
very words, containing a phonological string my of category NP/N, were used
by the source, John. Only contextually-driven, pragmatic reasoning about
John and his idiolect can tell us whether John uses my to refer to himself.
In other words, the phrase enclosed within the mixed quotation marks is
not part of Lsem and hence, strictly speaking, it has no lexically determined
meaning at all in the reporting context.
In sum, in this section I have presented a crude, compositional imple-
mentation of the free relative paraphrase, using a presuppositional definite
description operator and an analysis of pure quotation. The analysis does
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justice to the two central observations from Davidson: the verbatim require-
ment and grammatical incorporation. The proposed mix of use and mention
thus correctly captures key linguistic characteristics of the phenomenon,
such as indexical and language shifting.
In the next section I will identify a limitation of the current approach,
showing that we need to go beyond compositional semantics and bring in
pragmatics.
5 The pragmatics of mixed quotation
In the previous section we have analyzed mixed quotation by modeling the
free relative paraphrase in terms of a description operator. A mixed-quoted
σ refers to the X that the source referred to with her original utterance
of σ . To ensure compositionality, I assumed a Fregean, presuppositional
interpretation of the definite description: the description refers to the unique
satisfier of the predicate if that exists, but is undefined otherwise.
However, presupposition in natural language is more than just a defined-
ness condition that simply projects out of every embedding. Presuppositions
are known to be cancelable in certain environments, and moreover, they
can be accommodated. Below, I will show that mixed quotation exhibits
all the symptoms of genuine presuppositionality, even the subtle cases in-
volving local and intermediate accommodation. To account also for these
rarer accommodation varieties, and for the frequent informative character
of quotational presuppositions, I eventually adopt Van der Sandt’s (1992)
Presupposition-as-Anaphora implementation.
5.1 The presuppositionality of mixed quotation
Presupposition triggers are linguistic elements or constructions that impose
restrictions on when they can be used felicitously. Rephrased in slightly
more modern terminology than in section 4.2, they require a certain piece of
information to be present in the context. Typically, this is the global context,
the common ground between speaker and hearer at the time of utterance. A
use of a definite description like my sister thus presupposes that the existence
of my sister is already established in the common ground.
Typically, if the trigger occurs in an embedded position within a sentence,
the utterance as a whole still presupposes the same information: presupposi-
tions tend to project. We’ve discussed negation already in section 4.2 above,
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but the same holds for, say, embedding in the antecedent of a conditional.
So, If my sister were a spy, I’d know presupposes that I have a sister.
We’ve already seen the metalinguistic description introduced by a mixed
quote escape embedding under a reporting verb and a negation. Here’s
another example, with a conditional:
(64) If climate change is a “contrived phony mess”, then so is Wall Street.
Intuitively, (64) as a whole is only felicitous in a context where some utterance
of the words contrived phony mess is common ground.
But presuppositions do not always project: the distinct projection be-
havior that separates presupposition from other “projective content” is
characterized by two additional mechanisms: binding (or cancelation) and
accommodation.
Binding
An existential presupposition triggered by a definite can be satisfied or bound
by a corresponding indefinite or other construction that explicitly introduces
the existence of the presupposed entity. This may happen at discourse level,
with the trigger and indefinite occurring in different sentences, but also
within a single sentence. As an example of discourse binding, take (65):
(65) I have a sister. Mary thinks my sister is a spy
The discourse as a whole states, but does not presuppose, that I have a sister.
I’ll say that the presupposition triggered by my sister is globally bound by
the indefinite in the first sentence.
We can construct parallel discourse binding scenarios with mixed quo-
tation. Note that we need something like a coinage construction in order to
explicitly introduce the information presupposed by a mixed quote — that
someone used certain words to express something. Subsequent utterances
can then indeed pick up the newly coined form–meaning connection with the
help of a mixed quote:19
19 After a while, and in some cases immediately, we will drop the mixed quotation marking
and just enrich the language with a new lexical item. This would be an instance of a (minor
and presumably non-persistent) language change. By using mixed quotes as in (i) we don’t
have to change the language. Using (and pronouncing) the mixed quotes may be preferred
over the minute language change if the newly coined term is already in use with a different
meaning, or is remarkable in some other respect.
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(66) A: I’m using the word ‘misunderestimate’ as a new word to express
a kind of underestimating based on a misunderstanding.
B: Well, then you “misunderestimate” the English language!
If we assume that utterances generally (or occasionally, when required)
contribute, in addition to their content, also a metalinguistic proposition to
the effect that that content was expressed with such-and-such words,20 then
we might analyze echoic discourses like (67) as binding (or bridging) as well.
(67) A: Climate change is a contrived phony mess
B: Well, this “contrived phony mess” is going to be the death of us!
Local binding, traditionally referred to as cancelation, occurs when a pre-
supposition triggered in one clause is bound by a corresponding introduction
of the presupposed information somewhere else within the sentence. In such
a case, the sentence as a whole does not presuppose anything, even though it
contains a presupposition trigger.
(68) If France has a king, the King of France must be wealthy
Again, we can construct direct analogues with explicit metalinguistic intro-
ductions through coinage:
(69) a. Johnny thinks there’s a monster under his bed named ‘Growlser’,
and he fears that if he falls asleep and “Growlser” gets hungry, it
will eat him.21
b. If you use ‘leg’ to refer to a horse’s tail as well, how many “legs”
does a horse have?
The reading I’m after with (69b) is the one where the correct answer is
five. Note that in the version of the riddle (attributed to Abraham Lincoln)
without the mixed quotation marks in the consequent, the answer would be
four. Given the view of quotation and grammar defended here, the contrast
between these two version of (69b) can be explained by assuming that it’s
20 This is independently needed for all kinds of metalinguistic reference and anaphora, such as
the interpretation of the former/the latter, cf. Geurts & Maier 2003.
21 In the proper name literature, “Bambi examples” like this are typically presented and analyzed
without quotation marking (Geurts 1997). I hypothesize that since the coinage in the first
conjunct introduces a new word, there is no chance of confusion and the reporter may as
well drop the overt quotation marking, cf. footnote 19.
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impossible to propose a hypothetical language change to take effect mid-
sentence.
Accommodation
A presupposition that cannot be bound, locally or globally, need not lead
to an uninterpretable sentence. Most presuppositions will in fact easily be
accommodated (Lewis 1979). Noticing that there is no suitable antecedent
to bind to, the hearer automatically adjusts the common ground by adding
the presupposed information to it. This way, presuppositions can be used to
convey new information, in addition to their primary function of binding to
old information.
Take (70):
(70) I’m taking the day off because my daughter is ill.
This utterance may be perfectly felicitous in a situation where it is not yet
common knowledge that I have a daughter. The hearer is then said to globally
accommodate this presupposition.
Mixed quotational presuppositions are no exception. I can understand
the Perry example without prior knowledge that Perry had uttered those
words. In fact, mixed quotation reports are a very natural and efficient way
to inform me of someone’s word choice. In this respect, mixed quotational
presuppositions pattern with so-called informative presuppositions, such as
the complements of factives:
(71) a. We regret to inform you that children cannot accompany their




b. Have you noticed that your belly button lint color is related to the




These examples are entirely felicitous if it is not yet common ground that
children cannot accompany their parents, or that belly button lint color is
related to the color of clothing. Assuming that factives like regret and notice
are presupposition triggers, it looks like accommodation is the preferred
interpretation strategy for them.
Satisfaction-based analyses of presupposition that treat accommodation
as a pragmatic repair strategy are arguably less suited for dealing with
informative presupposition. This is one of the reasons for adopting here the
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more uniform approach to binding and accommodation offered by Van der
Sandt’s framework.
Part of the reason why we accommodate so easily in the case of our Perry
example is that the mixed quotation is part of an indirect speech report, i.e.,
it is explicitly asserted that Perry said something about climate change, so
it’s but a small step to accommodate that these very words were uttered by
him as part of the indirectly reported utterance. Again, we find parallels to
this phenomenon in the presupposition literature. It is often observed that
presuppositions that are explicitly related to something already salient or
present in the context accommodate better:
(72) {??The woman/my wife} is annoyed with me.
Indeed, mixed quotations occurring outside of an indirect speech environ-
ment are more easily rejected if it is not clear in advance that a contextually
salient individual uttered these words. In other words, we can more easily
apply von Fintel’s (2004) hey-wait-a-minute test:
(73) A: We should just carry on “irregardless.”
B: Hey wait a minute! Who here ever said irregardless?
This prediction holds, even if it’s relatively clear who the source is:
(74) A: Haha, looks like Palin herself “misunderestimated” this thing.
B: Hey wait a minute, I didn’t know Palin uses the verb ‘misunderes-
timate’ too. I thought that was a Bushism.
Finally, a more controversial aspect of presuppositionality is called local
accommodation, where a presupposition is used to update some non-global
context. Take the classic example in (75):
(75) A: I wonder why that guy is looking so glum.




B’s utterance is felicitous if neither A nor B have any knowledge of whether
the guy has a girlfriend or not. In such a case, global binding and accom-
modation are out. The intended reading is one where the presupposition is
accommodated in the local context embedded under the modal operator:
maybe he has a girlfriend and she jilted him.
Similar contexts allow local accommodation of the mixed quotational
presupposition:
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(76) A: Why are all the grammar nerds on the forum angry at her?
B: I don’t know, maybe she said she “could care less” about proper
usage?
In the intended interpretation, the quotational presupposition ends up under
the scope of the modal: maybe she uttered ‘could care less’ and said (using
that phrase) that she doesn’t care about proper usage.
The most contested variety within local accommodation is that where
the presupposition ends up in an intermediate position. Here’s a potential
example of an intermediate mixed quote accommodation:
(77) If a Tea Party member will win the next election, he’ll probably promise
not to “misunderrepresent” the middle class or something.
One prominent reading of (77) is through global accommodation or binding.
The speaker then echoes a specific Tea Partier’s previous use of the verb
‘misunderrepresent’. However, another plausible interpretation is one where
the speaker makes up the word ‘misunderrepresent’ to suggest the type of
language use associated with Tea Party members in general: If a Tea Party
member will win the next election, he’ll probably use the word ‘misunder-
represent’ and promise not to do (whatever he means by) that to the middle
class. This reading requires genuine intermediate accommodation.
In the previous section we have seen that the metalinguistic part of the
meaning of a mixed quotation projects. But it doesn’t simply always project,
it can be both bound and accommodated, under exactly the same conditions
as established presuppositions (factives, definite descriptions). Hence, our
semantic framework needs to be enriched with a theory of presupposition
resolution.
5.2 Discourse representation and presupposition
In Van der Sandt’s framework, interpretation is a two-stage process. In the
first stage, we compositionally generate Preliminary Discourse Represen-
tation Structures (PDRS). PDRSs are formulas in the formal language Lpdrs,
a syntactically minor variant of our intensional type theory L.22 The defin-
ing characteristic of PDRSs is that they represent all the presuppositions
triggered by definites and other lexical items or constructions. Lpdrs will re-
22 The semantics of Lpdrs is decidedly more complex, because of the underspecification inherent
in a PDRS, but to understand what follows we can safely skip it.
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place L to play the role of logical forms in our formal grammar, that is, they
represent semantic content. But content in this dynamic setting is different
from the classical propositional model of truth conditions. In semi-classical
terms, a PDRS constitutes a compositionally generated but highly under-
specified representation of the sentence’s truth conditions. In more dynamic
terms, a PDRS represent a sentence’s context change potential. This dynamic
metaphor points to DRT’s second stage of interpretation.
In the second stage of interpretation we use the sentence’s PDRS to update
a given representation of the discourse context, i.e., the common ground
at the point in the discourse when the sentence at hand is uttered. This
common ground will be represented as a DRS, a well-formed structure in the
language Ldrs (≈ Lpdrs without unresolved presuppositions). Ldrs has a classical
model-theoretic interpretation. In fact, expressions of this language can be
mapped onto corresponding formulas in L.
The contextual update consists in merging the DRS (context representa-
tion) and PDRS (sentence representation) and then trying to bind or accom-
modate the presuppositions in this augmented context. The result of binding
or accommodating all the presuppositions will again be a DRS, which can
serve as input context for interpreting the next utterance. Instead of spelling
out the presupposition resolution algorithm in detail, I’ll go through some
examples below.
But first, let’s get acquainted with the DRS language and the first stage of
interpretation. In contrast with L, Lpdrs has two syntactically distinct types of
formulas that are semantically of type t: DRS conditions (type tc), and DRSs
(type td).23 Variables are called discourse referents, and they come in various
types, as do constants:
(78) primitive expressions in Ldrs:
a. discourse referents: xe, ptd , Xetc ,. . .
b. constants: ie, owneetc , donkeyetc , say(std)etc . . .
We can combine these primitive expressions into complex ones according
to their types in the usual way (e.g., function application and lambda con-
version). An expression of type tc is called a DRS condition, one of type td a
DRS. Other ways of constructing DRSs and DRS conditions are as follows:
23 As far as model-theoretic interpretation is involved they are the same (Dtd = Dtc = {0,1}),
so whenever possible I’ll just use the underspecified t.
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(79) a. if U (the universe) is a set of discourse referents and C a set of
DRS conditions, then 〈U,C〉 is a DRS
b. if ϕ and ψ are DRSs, then ¬ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ are DRS conditions.
The idea is that the universe of a DRS asserts the existence of a set of in-
dividuals, and the conditions specify relations between those individuals. The
DRS conditional is special in that it functions more as a universal quantifier.
Here is an example DRS in box notation, separating universe and conditions
vertically:







I will not go into the semantics of Ldrs, except to note that there is a simple
algorithm for translating DRSs into our the static theory of types L. For
example, (80) translates as:
(81) ∃x[john(x)∧∀y[donkey(y)∧ own(x, y)→ beat(x, y)]]
We can use this translation to define the notion of a free or bound discourse
referent, and hence of open and closed DRSs. Furthermore, in a given DRS, we
say that a subDRS is accessible to another subDRS if a free discourse referent
in a condition in the latter would be bound by a corresponding discourse
referent in the universe of the former. That is, if a DRS is embedded in
another DRS, the higher DRS is accessible to the deeper one (where we count
the consequent of a conditional as embedded in the antecedent).
Lpdrs adds to Ldrs a way to represent existential presuppositions as DRS
conditions. Graphically, I use the dashed box for this purpose.






The interpretation of the PDRS in (82) presupposes that there exists an indi-
vidual that is King of France, and asserts that that individual is bald.
The compositional construction of PDRSs in Lsem typically involves many
presuppositional conditions. All definite descriptions, pronouns and proper
names trigger presuppositions. (83) shows an example of a typical derivation
step in Lsem. Note that he is treated as a presupposition, the content of which
is given by its phi-features (conveniently abbreviated as he(x)). Furthermore,
as a notational shorthand, I use a box with a single compartment to represent
either a DRS with an empty universe, or a conjunction of DRS conditions
(constituting a complex DRS condition) — whichever fits best.
(83)
µ


















Now on to stage two. Once we have derived a preliminary representation in
Lsem, we add it to the context DRS and execute the presupposition resolution
algorithm. Let me demonstrate how the algorithm works by going through an
example computation. Say we’re in a context where we’ve been discussing a
certain John and a donkey that he owns. We represent this as in (84), on the
left. Now, I say His father is a farmer. Our grammar will parse this sentence
(analyzing his father as the father of he, a combination of two presupposition
triggers in one) and yield the preliminary Lpdrs representation below:
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We merge these two structures and start the resolution process by binding
the presuppositions z and w. The presupposition resolution algorithm states
that a proper antecedent to bind a presupposed referent to should fulfill
at least the following semantic criteria: (i) it has to be a discourse referent
of the same type as the presupposed one; (ii) it has to be accessible to the
presupposition; and (iii) the semantic content associated with it (through the
conditions in which it occurs) should be compatible with the presupposed
content.
To see what that means, let’s start with w.24 The context provides two
accessible discourse referents of the right type, x and y, but only the former
is compatible with the semantic content associated with w (viz. he(w)). So
we can bind w to x, which means that we unify the two (and, for readability,

















This leaves the z presupposition, representing, now, the father of John. This
time, neither x nor y are suitable antecedents, because world knowledge tells
us that John is not the son of himself, nor of his donkey. The presupposition
resolution algorithm tells us that, if binding fails, we have to accommodate
the presupposition. In this framework, that simply means that we add it as a







24 This is really just for ease of presentation. An actual implementation would resolve both
presuppositions simultaneously, or would involve a richer representation of double presup-
positions in which each presupposed referent has its own conditions attached.
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This concludes our walkthrough of the presupposition construction and
resolution mechanisms. In the next section I formulate a mixed quotation
rule in this framework and show how it works.
5.3 Mixed quotation as a presupposition trigger
The revised, definitive, mixed quotation introduction rule is as follows:
(85)
µ






Note that I’m extending here the notational shorthand introduced with (83)
above: typically, the box in (85) does not represent an actual PDRS (of type t),
but rather an expression of the type τ of X (i.e., the type corresponding to
category C). Composing with another expression of a suitable type (e.g., τt),
means functional composition with the non-presuppositional part.25
Let me illustrate the new rule with the test case for our compositional
system from section 4.3.
(86) Joe complained that Mary “refudiated my faith”.
[=(62)]
In the first stage of interpretation we need to construct a PDRS. The syntax
guiding this construction hasn’t changed. The only difference is the replace-
ment of the Montagovian L expressions with Lpdrs expressions, and using the
revised mixed quotation rule (85) instead of (47).
25 In the example derivation in (88) the top and leftmost box are actually PDRSs, the rightmost
box is an expression of type et.
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my faith ; NP
∂
The PDRS generated in this way at the top node means that we presuppose
the existence of a person named Mary (y), a quotation source (x), and some
property (X) that x referred to when he or she uttered the quoted VP. The at
issue content contributed by this sentence is merely that this (presupposed)
y has that (presupposed) property X.












The second stage begins by adding the context representation. Say, Joe
and Mary have been the topic of discussion, so we have the right global












We have two presuppositions left: the source (x), and what the source meant
with the quoted words (X). We don’t really have enough context to be certain
who the source is, but since Joe is said to complain, which involves a speech
act, it seems natural to view him as the source here, so we bind x to j.
Following the presupposition resolution algorithm, we’re then looking for a
discourse referent to bind X to, i.e., we’re looking for some salient property
that has been established as the intended referent of Joe’s use of the phrase
refudiated my faith. We can imagine a discourse about Joe’s idiosyncratic use
of certain phrases, and in such a case we could maybe bind X. We will see
such a case shortly, but for now, let’s assume, X can’t bind and we have to
accommodate it. In presupposition theory it is generally assumed that global
accommodation is preferred over local accommodation, so we predict the







The truth conditions of this final output context are as follows: there is some-
one named Joe and someone named Mary, Joe used the phrase refudiated my
faith to refer to some property, and moreover Joe complained that Mary has
that property.
To evaluate this output, the first thing to note is that, as expected of
an implementation of the free relative paraphrase, the quoted first person
my does not refer to the actual speaker. Rather it’s part of the verbatim
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representation of what John, the reported speaker/source, said, and hence,
may be said to indirectly refer to him, as discussed already in 4.3.
Moreover, also as before, we do not presuppose that refudiate is a genuine,
meaningful lexical item in English, or in the common language of speaker
and hearer. Both the preliminary sentence representation and the eventual
output leave it completely open what refudiated my faith means.
However, it is very well possible that we later learn certain facts about
John’s idiolect that would allow us to determine what X was. Or perhaps
we may already infer, defeasibly, that he meant X to be either the property
of refuting John’s faith, or of repudiating John’s faith. I will not here offer
a theory of this type of pragmatic, meta-linguistic reasoning, but content
myself with analyzing the semantics (in the sense of deriving truth conditions,
which also incorporates the effects of presupposition resolution) of mixed
quotation. This means that, unless we have explicit coinage in the context
(local or global), the truth conditions of a mixed quotation leave it open what
was actually meant with the quoted words, even if the quoted words strongly
resemble words in the speaker and hearer’s own shared language.
So let’s turn to the mentioned coinage scenarios. In section (64), I argued
that these may involve binding of quotational presuppositions. Here is the
preliminary representation of a simplified example:
(90) If John uses ‘misunderestimate’ to refer to a combination of underes-









Intuitively, we’d want to bind what John referred to as ‘misunderestimates’ (the
presupposed relation X) to the combination of underestimating and misunder-
standing (λyλx[undrestim(x, y)∧misundrst(x, y)]). But there’s a technical
difficulty to overcome: we don’t usually introduce higher-order discourse ref-
erents into our DRS universes very often, so the standard binding mechanism
for individual type e presupposition doesn’t work.




(91) John is walking. He likes it.
We can bind he to the discourse referent for John, but to bind it we don’t have
a property-type discourse referent accessible for the walking. We’d have to
somehow create a property type discourse referent first.26 The construction
of and binding to such “abstract objects” is a rather delicate issue that I
cannot go into here (cf. Asher 1993), so let’s proceed as if we have a sound









We’ve now seen how quotational presuppositions can bind and accom-
modate. The presupposition resolution algorithm generally prefers binding,
but note that in the case of quotational presuppositions, binding requires
some kind of local or global coinage or other metalinguistic statement about
a form–meaning relation to be given in the context, which is somewhat rare.
We’ve illustrated global accommodation with a simple mixed report, showing
language and indexical shifting. The general tendency of presuppositions to
accommodate globally predicts precisely the wide scope readings already
observed in section 4.2.
Let’s see the global accommodation preference in action in a more deeply
embedded, non-reportive mixed quotation:
(92) I didn’t think it was possible that she would “misunderestimate” me
26 Alternatively, we can explore a more precise event semantics. Or rely on something like
Higher-Order Unification to do binding without explicit discourse referents in an accessible
universe (Dalrymple, Shieber & Pereira 1991).
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E(x,[misunderestimate\,X)
¬ think(i,∧ 3∧ X(x,i) )
We thus predict an “echoic” reading: an utterance of (92) presupposes an
earlier utterance of the word misunderestimate. More specifically, an utterance
of that verb by x to express some relation X. What the speaker of (92) then
asserts is that he didn’t think it possible that x would do X to him again.
In exceptional cases, global accommodation may be ruled out (e.g., be-
cause it would lead to an incoherent final output). We expect to get local
accommodation then. Here’s the example from section 5.1 (note: p = proper
usage):
(93) A: Why are all the grammar nerds on the forum angry at her?



















That is, maybe she uttered could care less and used that to say in what
relation she stands to proper usage.
The local accommodation in (93) enriched the local context where it
was triggered. Presupposition-as-Anaphora also allows accommodation at
intermediate stages. Arguably, this is exactly what is needed in the next
example, as discussed in section 5.1 (note: m = the middle class):
(94) If a Tea Party member will win the next election, he’ll probably promise





















In sum, adding a more sophisticated, dynamic presupposition theory to
our mixed quotation framework extends the empirical coverage by modeling
the various forms of binding and accommodation identified in section 5.1.
6 Beyond constituents
In this paper we have encountered many examples of mixed quotation. We
have arrived at a formal system that deals well with the basic cases like our
worn out Perry report, or Davidson’s “anomalous feature”. The system, based
on the free relative paraphrase, combines grammatical incorporation with the
verbatim requirement. Moreover, we have seen how to handle more original
cases involving (i) local and global presupposition binding and accommoda-
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tion, (ii) mixed quotations outside the context of indirect speech reports, and
(iii) mixed quotations with shifted indexicals and idiolects or errors.
In this section I consider a group of examples discussed in section 2.2
that cannot yet be dealt with. The root of the problem lies in the syntax–
semantics interface: our mixed quotation rule applies only to constituents.
We’ve encountered this restriction in the syntax: there is no way to parse (95)
because there is no node that dominates precisely breakfast at any time and
hence no place to insert the mixed quotation rule.
(95) The menu says that this restaurant [VP[VP serves “breakfast] [PP at any
time”]]
[=(13)]
From a semantic point of view, we cannot apply our mixed quotation rule
because to even formulate the mixed quote presupposition we need to know
its semantic type, which in turn depends on the syntactic category of the
phrase being quoted. But the quoted “phrase” here has no category, for it is
not a constituent.
There are various ways to solve this problem of non-constituent quotation,
first raised by Cumming 2005 against Geurts & Maier 2005. In 6.1 I critically
evaluate an earlier proposal of my own, by which we break the quote up
into constituent pieces (Maier 2008). In 6.2 I develop an empirically superior
alternative based on the mechanism of unquotation (Shan 2011). In 6.3 I
extend this to cover also the remaining aspects of transparency from 2.2 (e.g.,
word order adjustment and unshifted indexicals).
A third solution might be to adopt a grammatical framework with a more
relaxed notion of constituency. A reviewer suggests the use of Zettlemoyer &
Collins’s (2007) Combinatory Categorial Grammar with nonstandard combi-
nators. This very flexible grammar is designed to parse and interpret very
fragmentary sentences with deviant word order and missing words, so it
may even help with analyzing the transparency of mixed quotation beyond
non-constituent quotations. I leave this option for future research and stick
with the more traditional, rigid notion of constituency.
6.1 Quote breaking
A straightforward solution would be to break the quote in two and say
that (95) contains two mixed-quoted constituents (Maier 2008). That is, the
underlying syntax of (95) is really (96):
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(96) The menu says that this restaurant [VPserves “[NPbreakfast]”] “[PPat any
time]”.
That the two adjacent sets of quotation marks are spelled out as a single
quotation is then merely a matter of phonological spellout.
Zimmermann 2007 suggests taking this idea to its logical conclusion:27
mixed quotation applies, syntactically and semantically, only to lexical items.
(97) The menu says that this restaurant serves “breakfast” “at” “any”
“time”.
Via our mixed quotation rule, every quoted lexical item could refer to what
the quoted speaker used that word to refer to, and the quoted words would
all be of the same category and type as the underlying words. In this way
compositionality would even be restored.
However, Zimmermann and Shan 2011 raise an important objection: if
we break the quote up into smaller constituents we fail to capture the fact
that the quoted words were originally used in precisely the same syntactic
configuration that they are presented in in the mixed quote. As a concrete
counterexample, consider a situation in which the original utterance to be
reported is (98).
(98) The restaurant serves breakfast 24/7, so come in at any time.
The individual constituents quoted in (96) or (97) occur verbatim, moreover,
the semantic content of the report complement (assuming reporter and
reportee speak the same variety of English) is entailed by the semantic
content of (99). Still, intuitively, the original non-constituent mixed quote in
(95) is not an adequate report of this utterance.
Inspired by Shan’s work, in section 6.2 I’ll bring the notion of unquotation
to our framework and show how it can be used to account for some apparent
transparency effects noted in section 2.
6.2 Unquotation
In newspaper and technical writing square brackets are sometimes used to
indicate that a quotation is temporarily suspended. A quotation — mixed,
27 Zimmermann’s approach differs from mine in that he models mixed quotation in terms of a
language shifting operator à la Recanati.
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direct or pure — has to be verbatim, but for reasons of style and clarity, a
reporter might want to make a few editorial adjustments. In such cases,
handbooks like the Chicago Manual of Style allow square brackets to indicate
“occasional adjustments to the original”. They cite cases like (99) where a
verbatim quote would have a first person pronoun referring to the person
that the article is about (cf. the phenomenon of opacity-induced indexical
shift, discussed in 2.1).
(99) John complained that the teacher “misunderestimated [him] entirely”.
Other typical examples involve the bracketed adjustment of some inflection,
or the use of a full name or description in place of an otherwise potentially
ambiguous or vague pronoun:
(100) McCain likes to say he’ll “follow [Bin Laden] to the gates of hell”.
These are cases of what Shan calls semantic unquotation, and it is this
mechanism that I now want to capture within the current framework.28 My
implementation differs from Shan’s in a number of respects,29 but at the end
of this subsection I do follow him in applying the unquotation mechanism
as an alternative analysis of non-constituent quotation, and some other
transparency characteristics that we encountered in 2.2.
Pronoun adjustments like in (99) show that unquoted expressions have
to be evaluated from the perspective of the reporting speaker. But on the
current analysis everything in the scope of a mixed quote gets evaluated as
if uttered by the reported speaker. The situation is reminiscent of a very
central phenomenon in the history of semantics, viz., de re interpretation: a
term surfaces within the scope of an intensional operator, but is semantically
evaluated outside it. The most straightforward analysis of such a situation
is to assume some kind of movement. In this case, since the fact that we
have to move is overtly spelled out (by the brackets), the movement has to
be syntactic rather than pragmatic. In the generative picture of language, a
series of covert and overt movements get us from an underlying syntactic
base form to the logical form. Applied to (99), this means that, on the way to
28 Shan also discusses syntactic unquotation, where the material in brackets is the reporter’s
metalinguistic description of an elided phrase.




the logical form, the syntactically embedded direct object him is moved to a
position just above the quote.
(101) . . . that the teacher “misunderestimated [him]x entirely”.
So after the direct object moves out, what’s left within the quotation is
something like misunderestimated . . . entirely. In other words, what the
report presupposes is that John used the construction misunderestimated . . .
entirely to express some semantic object. Now, this so-called construction
is not a genuine syntactic constituent. It’s a VP with a hole in it, an extra
argument slot, that makes it semantically similar to a transitive verb. So, like
a transitive verb, this construction should be suitable for applying mixed
quotation.
To properly represent constructions like this in our grammar, the first
thing we need to add are phonetic variables. Say, x stands in for an unspecified
string of letters. In Lsyn we specify the category of the Lphon expressions that




, a syntactically well-formed expression that
functions as an NP. We can concatenate such an NP-variable with a transitive
verb to get a VP, and so on:
(102)
¨
misunderestimated x entirely ; VP
∂
¨










The VP in (102) is not yet a proper representation of the construction
misunderestimated . . . entirely. To get there we apply lambda abstraction to
the free variable. Think of the construction as a function, viz. one that takes
an NP, say Mary, as input and gives a VP, misunderestimated Mary entirely,
as output. Just as we have semantic lambda conversion to get you from
walk(j) to (λx[walk(x)])(j) and back, I assume phonetic lambda conversion
to get analogous deductions between misunderestimated Mary entirely and
(λx. misunderestimated x entirely)(Mary).
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For Lsyn, this means we can get parse trees like the following:30
(103)
¨





λx.misunderestimated x entirely ; NP\VP
∂


































∏ Æentirely ;VP\VP ∏
We see the bracketed him moved out, leaving behind a phonosyntactic NP-
variable, bound by a lambda. The lambda expression as a whole represents a
construction, and it is this construction that is quoted. The resulting mixed
quotation inherits its category from the quoted term, in this case not a
construction of category NP\VP. This category corresponds to the semantic
type eet, same as a transitive verb. In the rest of the tree above we see
30 We could extend this to Lsem, pairing phonetic variables and lambdas with corresponding
semantic variables and lambdas, but we don’t need that for our current purposes.
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the quotation being integrated into a sentence by combining it with two NP
arguments, the moved out him and then the subject teacher.
I’ve left out the semantic component of the mixed quotation node in (104).
That is, the presupposition that someone (u)31 used the quoted construction
to refer to something (X). The question is always, what is the semantic type
of that presupposed X? In other words, what kind of semantic object did the
source use the construction to refer to? In this case, although the quoted
expression is not a constituent but a construction, it has a category, and
hence it determines a type, eet, for the quote presupposition. Here is the





As I announced above, the unquotation mechanism can help us analyze
non-constituent quotation without breaking the quote. For instance, the
underlying form of (96) could be:
(106) The menu says that this restaurant “[serves] breakfast at any time”.
According to (106), the mixed quotation applies not to the non-constituent
breakfast at any time, but to the construction . . . breakfast at any time. The
latter is a construction of category (VP/NP)\VP. We then presuppose that
that construction was used verbatim, that is, the words breakfast at any time
were used literally, in conjunction with a transitive verb to the left. The verb
serves is not really part of the quote and hence could just be the reporter’s
paraphrase of that original transitive verb.
Other recalcitrant signs of transparency in quotations identified in 2.2
could be the result of covert unquotation, i.e., of an invisible unquote
movement. Take the occasional adjustment of indexicals, and the bind-
ing/adjustment of pronouns within mixed quotations. I propose that these
readings are the result of unquotation. Their underlying syntax is really as
follows:




31 I use u instead of x so we don’t have to rely on typography to distinguish x (the semantic
variable) from x (the phonological variable).
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b. The row over the EU’s plan to label tar sands oil as highly pollut-





To recap: given the verbatim requirement, mixed quotation is predicted to
be very opaque, and given the free relative inspired account of grammatical
incorporation, it is predicted to apply only at constituent boundaries. In
actual language use these restrictions lead to conflicts with other, not yet
fully understood, pragmatic/stylistic principles, such as a tendency to avoid
indexical shifts (explicitly formulated in prescriptive handbooks like the
Chicago Manual of Style). One solution to such conflicts would be the insertion
of unquotation brackets, but this appears to be restricted to certain genres
of written text. I propose that in some other cases of apparent transparency
(discussed above) we have the same unquotation in the syntax, but it does
not get expressed phonologically.
6.3 Transparency and movement
When discussing the transparency of mixed quotation in section 2.2 we
encountered various transformations or movements: wh-movements, Dutch
word order adjustment (a movement at the level of Phonological Form (PF)),
and inverse scope readings (a movement at Logical Form (LF)).
The first two types involve adjustments to the original surface form,
and thus contradict the verbatim requirement. The LF movement cases are
unexpected in that they seem to require that the quotation is broken up. I
will argue that these unexpected forms of transparency are really a mixed
bag, so I’ll confront them in turn below.
But first, a few words on the generative “inverted Y” model of grammar
that I’m assuming when I talk about different types of movement. The idea
is that we generate first an underlying syntactic structure (SS) which, via
movements, can be developed in two directions: one branch goes to LF, which
gives us a logical form (and from there a model-theoretic interpretation);
the other goes to PF, where a syntactic tree is linearized and articulated
phonetically (in writing, signing, or speaking). In our categorial picture of
grammar, this means that the various intermediate stages of derivation from
SS to LF and to PF may all be viewed as trees in Lsyn. In the final stage in
the LF branch we switch from Lsyn to Lsem, adding logical forms. In the PF
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branch we eventually switch from Lsyn to Lphon, linearizing the tree and
cutting the category labels.
Below I discuss first the movements that affect LF and hence truth condi-
tions. Since these seem to break the strong verbatim constituent requirement,
I will posit an underlying unquotation. The PF adjustments, finally, can be
handled without unquotation if we lift the notion of verbatimness from Lphon
to Lsyn.
Wh-movement
In our section on transparency (2.2) I presented the following counterexample
to the block on wh-movement briefly suggested in the section on opacity
(2.1):
(108) Who did Mary say she would “never misunderestimate ever again”?[=(21)]
In keeping with the proposed analysis of indexical adjustments from section
6.2, I propose that the underlying syntax must have been as in (109):
(109) Mary said that she would “never misunderestimate [who] ever again”?
Unquote movement first places the wh-object out of the quote, from where a
subsequent wh-movement can take it to the front. As a result, (109) presup-
poses that Mary used the construction never underestimate . . . ever again to
refer to a two-place relation R, and asks who Mary said she bears R to.
Quantifier Raising
On to pure LF movements. At first sight a similar unquotation seems enough
to allow the inverse scope readings of mixed quotations. If the syntax of (14)
is as in (110) we can apply unquote movement followed by Quantifier Raising
(QR, Heim & Kratzer 1998) to get the inverse scope reading.




Unfortunately, the reading predicted by (110) may be too weak, as it allows
non-verbatim paraphrases of the quantifier every professor. In particular,
(110) would be true already if the dean literally said (111):
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(111) We should make sure that at least one student accompany each and
every professor.
One way to solve this is to combine the strategies of quote breaking and
unquotation:
(112) The dean asked that a student “accompany [“every professor”]”.
This preserves both the form of the two expressions (accompany and every
professor), and their syntactic structure.
But there’s a less ad hoc solution: treat it like a non-constituent quotation.
More specifically, assume a larger quotation, all the way to clause level, but
with unquotation on the parts that surface outside of the quotation marks.
(113) The dean asked that “[a student] accompany every professor”.
The immediate advantage over the previous proposal is that we employ the
same general technique as already posited for other forms of non-constituent
quotation. In terms of truth conditions, we correctly predict that the dean
used the exact string accompany every professor. However, it’s supposed to
have been used as part of the construction, . . . accompany every professor,
which in the original took as input some quantifier paraphrased by the
reporter as a student. What the dean originally meant to express with her use
of this construction is not communicated by the report. She may or may not
have intended a reading where every professor QRs above the unknown NP
subject (i.e., inverse scope).
If, hypothetically, the reporter were to suggest, in the larger context of
the report, that the construction was meant without QR, while the dean
clearly meant the inverse scope reading, the report would at the very least
be misleading. This would however not be on account of the quotational
presupposition not finding a suitable antecedent, but, I propose, on account
of the semantic content, i.e., in the at-issue dimension. Zimmermann provides
the following example that neatly illustrates this point.32

















‘We’ll provide a daycare spot for every child.’
32 The example and reports are from Zimmermann’s handout, but my argument and conclusions
do not follow his.
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Clearly, the intended reading is the one with inverse scope: at least one



















‘The minister promised to provide a daycare spot for every child.’
If (115) corresponded to the logical form, it would presuppose that this
minister used the expression einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind to refer
to something. But that would mean that she used it as a constituent. In
the actual original (114), however, she indeed used it as a phonologically
verbatim unit, but not as a single, contiguous constituent. I propose that in
the underlying syntactic structure, the whole embedded clause is quoted,
with the verb unquoted:
(116) Die Ministerin versprach “[PRO] einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind
[einzurichten]”.
What is quoted then is a construction, a clause with two holes in it. What is
presupposed is that she used this clause-with-holes. Now, unlike the smaller
unit einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind, this larger construction is in fact used
verbatim as such in the original. The minister used that same construction.
Moreover, she used it to refer to something via an LF derived by QR’ing the
second quantifier over the first.
Now consider a disingenuous reporter:
(117) Ein einfaches Kardinalitätsargument zeigt, dass es unmöglich ist
“einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind” einzurichten.
A simple cardinality argument shows that it’s impossible to provide
“a daycare spot for every child”.
This reporter does use einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind as a single con-
stituent. If we say that in this case (117) models exactly the form to be
interpreted, then we would predict, correctly I think, that the report is
false, following the reasoning above. To preempt a charge of ad hoc LF
assumption, and as an illustration of the full power of the unquotation-plus-
presuppositional-mixed-quotation framework, let’s see what happens on the
more generous construal in (118):
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(118) . . . dass est unmöglich ist “[PRO] einen Kitaplatz für jedes Kleinkind
[einzurichten]”.
On this analysis, interestingly, the report is still infelicitous, but for a different
reason. The presupposition triggered by (118) is that the quoted construction
was used by the source to express a complex semantic object X. We know,
from the context, that the minister did indeed say something that we can
construe as containing that construction. She used the construction to refer
to some complex semantic object, say Y . Now, Y represents the minister’s
meaning, with the inverse scope of the quantifiers. The presupposition that
x used the quoted construction to refer to X is only satisfied in the actual
context if x = the minister, and X = Y . But then, after resolving the presup-
position like this, consider what (118) says: a simple cardinality argument
shows it’s impossible to provide X. But, since in the context X = Y and Y is
the minister’s intended interpretation, it is not impossible to provide X, or at
least not on the basis of a “simple cardinality argument.”
Movement and adjustment in the phonological branch
The last remaining examples to consider are (16b) and (18), where a mixed
quote is judged felicitous even though there is a clear mismatch between
some surface characteristics (word order, grammatical gender) in the quota-
tion and in the original.
In (16b) we saw a mixed quotation that has undergone word order ad-




























‘John says he’ll give that idiot a taste of his own medicine’
[=(16b)]
The quoted fragment here has adopted the SOV word order of indirect
discourse, despite the fact that the original utterance had a main clause, SVO
word order.
In Dutch, SOV is assumed to be the underlying syntactic base structure,
from which the main clause word order may be derived via a movement of
the verb (Koster 1975). Given the analyses of movement above, we might start
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thinking about quote breaking and/or unquotation again. However, since
this movement only affects the PF surface realization, not the semantics,
a simpler analysis presents itself. I propose to capture PF adjustments in
mixed quotation generally by weakening the verbatim requirement: two
phonological forms are verbatim-equivalent if they can be derived from the
same underlying syntactic structure. In other words, a quotation counts as
verbatim if the differences can be reduced to movements at PF, without
affecting LF.
To flesh this out further, I propose a modification of our mixed quotation
rule to the effect that what’s quoted, at SS, is not a phonological string, but
a full-fledged syntactic expression. This necessitates some minor tweaks to
our semantics. We broaden the domain of entities by including syntactic
expressions, and we redefine [ \ to denote the identity function on Lsyn
rather than Lphon. The metalinguistic presupposition (E(x, [σ\,X)) now in-
volves a relation between a source, a syntactic expression, and a semantic
object. Crucially, this syntactic object need not be the eventual output of the
PF branch. To allow word order changes and the like, I’ll assume that it’s a
deeper syntactic structure, i.e., representing a derivation stage right before
the split between LF and PF. A different phonological realization that shares
this structure will then count as a verbatim match.33
In addition, we can now assume that in the PF branch of the derivation,
quotation marks do not hinder PF movements within or across the mixed
quotation boundaries. In other words, mixed quotation is phonetically fully
transparent. This would predict the observed obligatory nature of PF adjust-
ments: embedded in indirect discourse, it is actually impossible to use a main
clause word order within a mixed quotation, as observed in section 2.2.
The above can be extended to cover grammatical gender adjustment,
(18), as well. We just assume, quite uncontroversially, that the transmission
and/or spellout of uninterpreted features (like Romance grammatical gender)
happens in the PF branch of the derivation.34 Evidently, a lot remains to be
33 As before, applying pure LF movements like QR to a syntactic expression also doesn’t affect
verbatimness: a quoted syntactic object at this particular derivation stage (before the LF/PF
split) does not determine quantifier scope any more than a quoted phonological string did.
34 Perhaps further tweaking of the verbatim relation in this manner could help describe certain
permissible “editorial cleanup adjustments” involving translation, and adjustments of false
starts, hedges etc. Importantly, as shown in section 2, these cleanups are not obligatory in
mixed quotation. Moreover they are allowed in direct discourse and in some cases even pure
quotation, so a more general analysis, built into the semantics of pure quotation, may be
called for.
7:62
Mixed quotation: The grammar of apparently transparent opacity
explored about the effects of the above suggestions on various phenomena
in the phonology–syntax–semantics interfaces, but I will leave it at this.
To sum up, various types of movement interact in very different ways with
the semantics of mixed quotation: (i) wh-movement out of mixed quotations
requires that the wh-word is syntactically unquoted; (ii) the cases involving
apparent QR out of mixed quotes are simply special cases of non-constituent
mixed quotations, and hence amenable to a uniform treatment in terms of
unquotation; and (iii) superficial PF adjustments can be accounted for by
tweaking the notion of verbatimness in mixed and pure quotation.
7 Conclusion
Mixed quotation presupposes that the quoted phrase was used verbatim in
an earlier utterance. It follows that mixed quotation is opaque: indexicals are
not adjusted to integrate into the reporting context, and even speech errors
or idiolectal variation is preserved:
(120) Joe complained that Mary “refudiated my faith”.
In these respects mixed quotation behaves like more purely metalinguistic
forms of quotation such as direct discourse and pure quotation.
On the other hand, a mixed quotation is fully grammatically incorpo-
rated into the reporting sentence. A mixed-quoted VP behaves like a VP, a
mixed-quoted PP like a PP. In terms of syntactic composition, it’s as if the
grammar doesn’t see the quotation marks. In this sense, mixed quotation is
syntactically transparent, patterning more with compositional language use
than with pure and direct quotation.
I have provided an analysis of mixed quotation that deals with these
central characteristics. The leading idea was that “refudiated my faith” means
what x refers to with his utterance of ‘refudiated my faith’. A compositional
implementation fails on account of a clear projection preference of the met-
alinguistic component of this proposed interpretation. Since the projection
behavior matches precisely that commonly associated with presupposition, I
proposed the following analysis of (120):
(121) presupposition: Joe used the phrase ‘refudiated my faith’ to refer to
some property X.
at-issue: Joe complained that Mary has property X.
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The resulting theory combines grammatical transparency with opacity and
verbatimness, and furthermore relies on an independently motivated analysis
of presupposition resolution to account for a variety of observable projection
properties.
Unfortunately, there is a lot of data that purports to show that mixed
quotation is much more transparent than this basic theory predicts. Various
movements and adjustments to the presupposed original are in fact allowed
in mixed quotations. These observations appear to be in direct contradiction
with the assumed opacity of mixed quotation that is part and parcel of my
proposed semantics.
To resolve this paradox, I have argued that these various appearances
of transparency are the result of a mechanism that is, in a sense, the dual
of mixed quotation: unquotation. If I’m right, the relatively unknown phe-
nomenon of unquotation should thus play a vital part in an empirically
adequate semantics of mixed quotation.
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